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Trump v. Hawaii
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The principle of religious neutrality in the laws of the United States
comes as a tenet from the Establishment Clause of the Constitution.1 The
command of the Establishment Clause is that “Congress shall make no law
respecting any establishment of religion.”2 The Supreme Court was recently
tasked with balancing Establishment Clause jurisprudence and foreign affairs
deference in Trump v. Hawaii. 3 Just what the Establishment clause
guarantees and how it should be interpreted and reviewed has been a
challenge for the Supreme Court.4 What seems consistent throughout the
Supreme Court’s review of Establishment Clause claims is its interpretation
that the government cannot demonstrate a preference for any religion nor
favor adherents of one religion collectively over others.5 In this case,
Plaintiffs challenged President Donald Trump’s Presidential Proclamation
which restricted entry to the United States from six Muslim majority
countries after making numerous denigrating comments along his campaign
trail calling for a shutdown of Muslim immigration.6 The Proclamation was
challenged on statutory grounds and Establishment Clause grounds.7 Lower
courts granted a nationwide injunction on statutory grounds.8 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.9 In resolving the Establishment Clause claim, Chief
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, applied the rational basis standard
of review and determined there was not a violation of the Establishment
Clause.10
Typically, when there is a violation of the Establishment Clause alleged,
the Court has applied a variation of what is known as the Lemon test, and has
in some instances applied Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement test,” which is a
variant of the Lemon test aimed at ensuring that the government does not

1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Id.
3. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419-20 (2018).
4. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 869 (2000) (Sotomayor J., Dissenting) (“In all the years of
its effort, the Court has developed no single test [for Establishment Clause claims] of constitutional
sufficiency.”).
5. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245 (1982).
6. Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392 at 2417.
7. Id. at 2406.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2407.
10. Id. at 2420.

261
Published by DigitalCommons@ONU, 2018

1

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 45 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 9

262

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

endorse or disfavor any religion.11 This standard of review would have asked
“whether a reasonable observer, presented with all of the ‘openly available
data,’ the text and ‘historical context’ of the Proclamation, and the ‘specific
sequence of events’ leading to it, would conclude that the purpose of the
Proclamation is to disfavor Islam and its adherents by excluding them from
the country.’”12 The dissent pointed out over twenty instances along
President Trump’s campaign and after taking his oath of office where he
made inflammatory statements about Islam and referred to “a total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”13 Both dissents
concluded there was sufficient evidence of religious animus to rise to the level
of a violation of the Establishment Clause and would have left the injunction
in place.14 15 This article takes the position that a more stringent standard of
review should have been applied and suggests a variation of the Lemon test
and endorsement tests for alleged Establishment Clause violations against
broad-sweeping entry policies.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts

In January 2017, President Donald Trump passed Executive Order No.
13769 entitled “Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the
United States.” (EO-1).16 It directed the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and other intelligence agencies to conduct a worldwide review of the
adequacy of information provided by each country’s government about its
nationals seeking entry into the United States.17 Pending review, entry of
nationals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen were
11. Douglas Shimonek, Comment, Using the Lemon Test as Camouflage: Avoiding the
Establishment Clause, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 835, 836 (1990); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971).
12. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2438, (quoting McCreary Cty. v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky.,
545 US 844 at 862-863 (2005)).
13. Id. at 2435-38.
14. Id. at 2433. (Breyer J., dissenting)
If the Court must decide the question without this further litigation, I would, on balance, find
the evidence of antireligious bias, including statements on a website taken down only after the
President issued the two executive orders preceding the Proclamation, along with the other
statements set forth in Justice Sotomayor’s opinion, a sufficient basis to set the Proclamation
aside.
Id. at 2445. (Sotomayor J., dissenting) (“As the foregoing analysis makes clear, plaintiffs are likely to
succeed in their Establishment Clause claim.”).
16. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg 8977 § 3(a) (January 27, 2017) (hereinafter EO-1).
17. Id. at § 3(a).
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suspended.18 The District Court for the Western District of Washington
entered a temporary restraining order blocking the restrictions and the Ninth
Circuit upheld the restraining order.19 The President responded by revoking
EO-1 and replaced it with Executive Order No. 13780 (EO-2) which still
directed the worldwide review and temporarily restricted the entry of
nationals from the same countries, except Iraq, for 90 days pending the
review.20 The District Courts of Hawaii and Maryland entered nationwide
preliminary injunctions barring enforcement of the restrictions, which were
upheld by the Courts of Appeals.21
After the worldwide review, President Trump issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 9645, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for
Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other
Public-Safety Threats.”22 The Proclamation described a baseline for vetting
procedures and information required from foreign governments to confirm
the identity of individuals seeking entry into the United States and to
determine whether they posed a security threat.23
The DHS evaluated data from all foreign governments. It identified
sixteen countries whose information-sharing practices were deficient, and
thirty-one countries at risk of failing to meet the baseline.24 After a fifty-day
period of diplomatic efforts to encourage foreign governments to improve
their practices, the Secretary of Homeland Security concluded that Chad,
Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Venezuela, and Yemen were still deficient in
willingness to provide adequate information and recommended the President
impose entry restrictions on all except Iraq.25 Further, entry restrictions on
certain Somalian nationals remained in place because of Somalia’s terrorist
presence and information management deficiencies, despite meeting the
baseline criteria.26 The President adopted the recommendations invoking his
authority under § 1185(a) and § 1182(f) of the Immigration and Nationality

18. Id. at § 3(c).
19. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
20. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (March 6, 2017) (hereinafter EO-2).
21. International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 635 (4th Cir. 2017);
Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 785 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
22. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161(September 24, 2017).
23. Id. at § 3(c). The baseline had three components. The first, “identity management information,”
focused on whether a foreign government ensures the integrity of travel documents. The second focused
on the extent to which each country discloses information on criminal history, suspected terrorist links,
and whether it provides the U.S. Government with travel exemplars and information on passengers and
crews traveling to the U.S. The third weighed national security risk factors, such as whether the country
refuses to receive returning nationals after final orders of removal from the U.S.
24. Id. at § 1(e).
25. Id. at §§ 1(g), (h). Iraq was excepted because of its government’s cooperative relationship with
the U.S. government and Iraq’s commitment to fighting ISIS.
26. Id. at § 2(h).
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Act (INA) and the Proclamation said that restrictions would help encourage
cooperation while protecting the United States.27
The restrictions placed on the respective countries varied based on their
unique circumstances.28 Iran, North Korea, and Syria, which do not cooperate
with the U.S. in identifying security risks, had entry suspended for all
nationals except Iranians seeking nonimmigrant student and exchange-visitor
visas.29 For Chad, Libya, and Yemen, only entry of nationals seeking
immigrant visas and nonimmigrant business or tourist visas were restricted,
because these countries were considered valuable counterterrorism partners.30
The Proclamation suspended entry of Somalian nationals seeking immigrant
visas and required additional scrutiny of nationals seeking nonimmigrant
visas.31 Venezuela refused to cooperate in information sharing, but because
there were alternative means to identify its nationals, entry was suspended
only for certain government officials and their families on nonimmigrant
business or tourist visas.32 Lawful permanent residents and foreign nationals
who had been granted asylum were exempt from the Proclamation, and a
case-by-case waiver program was described in the Proclamation which would
apply for foreign nationals who demonstrated undue hardship, that their entry
is in the national interest, and who would not pose a threat to public safety.33
Further, the Proclamation directed DHS to assess whether the restrictions
should be modified every 180 days.34 After the first review period,
restrictions on Chad were lifted because it had improved its practices.35
B. Procedural history
There were three plaintiffs in this case: three U.S. citizens or lawful
permanent residents with family from Iran, Syria, and Yemen applying for
immigrant or nonimmigrant visas, the State of Hawaii as operator of the
University of Hawaii systems which recruits students and faculty from the
designated countries, and the Muslim Association of America, a nonprofit
organization that operates a mosque in Hawaii.36 They challenged the
Proclamation, except as applied to North Korea and Venezuela, arguing that
the Proclamation ran contrary to provisions of the Immigration and
27. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161§ 1(h).
28. Id.
29. Id. at §§ 2(b), (d), (e).
30. Id. at §§ 2(a), (c), (g).
31. Id. at § 2(h).
32. Id. at § 2(f).
33. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161§ 3(c)(i).
34. Id. at § 4.
35. Maintaining Enhanced Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into
the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, 83 Fed. Reg. 15937 (April 10, 2018).
36. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2406.
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Nationality Act (INA) and that it violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment because it was motivated by religious animus toward Islam
rather than legitimate national security interests.37
The district court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction because it
found that the Proclamation violated § 1182(f) of the INA, as the President
did not make sufficient findings that the entry of the covered foreign nationals
would be detrimental to the interests of the United States and § 1152(a)(1)(A)
because the policy discriminated against visa applications on the basis of
nationality.38 The Ninth Circuit granted a partial stay allowing enforcement
of the Proclamation only to foreign nationals who “lack a bona fide
relationship with the United States.”39 The Supreme Court stayed the
injunction in full, pending disposition of the government’s appeal.40 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Proclamation exceeded the
President’s grant of authority under § 1182(f) because it only allows for
temporary suspension of entry in response to specific fast-breaking
exigencies.41 The court said that the Proclamation conflicted with the
comprehensive regulatory scheme already provided for by Congress with the
INA.42 The court did not address the Establishment Clause claim.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.43 Chief Justice Roberts wrote for
the majority in a five to four decision reversing the injunction as an abuse of
discretion and remanding the case to the District Court.44 Five holdings
emerged. The Court held that the President fulfilled the requirement of the
INA provision by finding that entry of aliens from covered countries would
be detrimental to interests of U.S.45 The Court held that the INA provision
that prohibits national origin discrimination in issuing immigrant visas (8
USC § 1152(a)(1)(A)) does not limit the President’s authority to suspend
entry by aliens or classes of aliens.46 The Court held that rational basis review
would be applied to an Establishment Clause claim concerning entry of
foreign nationals.47 The Court held the Proclamation did not violate the
Establishment Clause.48 Finally, the Court officially overruled the holding of

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp.3d 1140, 1155-59 (D. Haw. 2017).
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2406.
Id.
Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 688 (9th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 689-90.
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2407.
Id. at 2403.
Id. at 2407.
Id. at 2408.
Id. at 2420.
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
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Korematsu v. United States.49 Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas wrote
separate concurring opinions, Justice Breyer wrote a dissent that Justice
Kagan joined, and Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissent that Justice Ginsburg
joined.50
III.

COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE
A. MAJORITY OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS
In relevant part, § 1182(f) says:
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any
class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the
interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such
period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or
any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the
entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.51

The Court held that the President did not exceed his authority under §
1182(f) because the provision vests the President the authority to impose
limitations, including in response to circumstances that might affect the
vetting system.52 The Court held that it was a valid exercise of Presidential
authority because the plain text of the statute, affords the President broad
discretion to determine whose entry would be detrimental, whose entry to
suspend, when to suspend, for how long, and on what conditions.53 This was
done, the Court said, because he ordered agencies to conduct comprehensive
reviews to create a risk assessment baseline to determine whose entry would
be detrimental, then set out country-specific restrictions to apply until each
country’s inadequacies improved.54 The Court also said that even if some
form of judicial review on the persuasiveness of the reasoning for the
Proclamation were appropriate, it was more detailed than any prior order a
President has issued under §1182(f) and, moreover, that the inquiry to the
persuasiveness of the President’s justifications is inconsistent with the broad

49. Id. (In Korematsu, the Court upheld an exclusion order that forcibly relocated Japanese
American citizens to internment camps. The majority abrogated the decision in this case because Justice
Sotomayor’s dissent drew parallels between the Court’s rationale in Korematsu and the majority’s holding
here. Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “the forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely
and explicitly on basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority.”)
See also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.
50. Id. at 2424.
51. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
52. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2408.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2408-09.
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statutory text and traditional deference afforded the President within the
sphere of foreign affairs.55
The Court said the Proclamation supplemented the INA, and did not
attempt to supplant it as Plaintiffs argued, because it ensured that consular
officers would receive accurate information in the vetting process.56 The
Court said there was no conflict with the existing Visa Waiver system which
allows travel without a visa for short term visitors from countries in a security
partnership with the United States and eligibility for the partnership requires
broad assessments of the countries’ security operations and those
governments undergo a comprehensive evaluation of how well they enforce
security standards.57 The Court said Congress did not solve “the exact
problem” with the existing program because Congress did not attempt to
determine whether high-risk countries provide a minimum baseline of
information to adequately vet their nationals.58 The Court did not accept
Plaintiffs’ argument that based on previous presidential practice, suspension
orders under § 1182(f) have either targeted discrete groups deemed harmful
by the immigration laws or banned entry of entire nationalities as a response
to diplomatic emergencies that the immigration laws did not address.59
The Plaintiffs’ other statutory argument was that the suspension violates
8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) because it should be interpreted to prohibit
nationality-based discrimination throughout the immigration process, both to
the question of a visa applicant’s eligibility for admission and the subsequent
question of whether the holder may enter the country.60
Section
1152(a)(1)(A), in relevant part, reads: “[N]o person shall receive any
preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an
immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, nationality, place of birth,
or place of residence.”61
The Court rejected this argument, as it explained that § 1182(f) and §
1152(a)(1)(A) operate in different spheres; section 1182 defines the universe
of aliens eligible to receive a visa and § 1152 prohibits the allocation of
immigrant visas based on nationality and other traits.62 In other words, the
Court said that § 1152 does not apply to admissibility but is limited to visa
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2410.
57. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2411-12. (Furthermore, the Court pointed to the Visa Waiver Program’s
special exemptions for citizens of countries that maintain exemplary security standards and offer reciprocal
privileges to U.S. citizens but noted it did not address what requirements should govern the entry of
nationals from countries that fall short of those standards, and the Proclamation supplements the Program
in that way.)
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2413.
60. Id. at 2413-2414.
61. 8 USC § 1152(a)(1)(A).
62. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2414.
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issuance after the admissibility determination has been made.63 Furthermore,
the Court said that § 1152 has never been treated as a constraint on
admissibility.64
Arguably the more controversial claim in this case was the second issue
the Court faced, which was whether the Proclamation was issued for the
unconstitutional purpose of excluding Muslims.65 The Court first stated that
in cases arising from alleged violations of the Establishment Clause a plaintiff
must show that he is “directly affected by the laws and practices against
which his complaints are directed.”66 This was an issue because the entry
restrictions applied to noncitizens.67 The Court said the three individual
plaintiffs asserted a concrete interest because “a person’s interest in being
united with his relatives is sufficiently concrete and particularized for the
basis of an Article III injury in fact.”68
The majority first recognized “the clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially
preferred over another.”69 The Plaintiffs alleged that the primary basis for the
proclamation was religious animus and the stated concerns about vetting
protocols and national security were pretexts for discrimination.70 The
majority listed several examples of the President’s statements both during his
campaign trail and after being elected to office where he referred to the
dangers of Islam, shared his plan to ban entry of Muslim people, and once
even retweeted anti-Muslim propaganda videos while sitting as President.71
The Court emphasized that the issue here, though, was reviewing a
presidential directive that was neutral on its face which addressed a matter
within the core of executive responsibility.72 Accordingly, the majority

63. Id.
64. Id. at 2415 (The majority then compared the present proclamation to Regan’s Executive Order
5517 which suspended entry of all Cuban nationals and Carter’s Executive Order 12172 which revoked
visa issuance from all Iranian nationals. The Court said that those orders would have been inadmissible
based on the Plaintiff’s reading of § 1152, as would the restrictions on North Korea by the Proclamation,
which were not challenged by the plaintiffs.) Id.; (The Court also said that there is no textual basis to
suggest that Congress intended to create an implicit exception for presidential actions which would limit
§ 1152(a)(1)(A) to specific fast breaking exigencies because this would require courts to determine
whether a foreign government’s conduct rises to the level that would trigger a fast breaking exigency and
1152(a)(1)(A) does not give any standards that would enable courts to assess which situations justify entry
restrictions). Id.
65. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2415.
66. Id. at 2416. (quoting School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224
(1963)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2417. (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 244).
70. Trump,138 S. Ct. at 2417.
71. Id. at 2417-18.
72. Id. at 2418.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol45/iss1/9

8

Schaad: Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)

2019]

TRUMP V. HAWAII

269

applied the rational basis standard of review.73 The opinion went on to say
that the policy would be upheld as long as it could “reasonably be understood
to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional grounds.”74 The
Court said the only way that the policy would be upended was if the law at
issue lacked any purpose other than a “bare desire to harm a politically
unpopular group.”75 The majority opined that standards of review generally
applied to Establishment Clause claims would be inappropriate to apply in
this situation, because of deference due to the President within this context.76
The Court went on to say that under rational basis review, the
Proclamation did not violate the Establishment Clause because it was
expressly premised on legitimate purposes: namely preventing entry of
nationals who could not be adequately vetted and inducing other nations to
improve their practices, and because the text of the Proclamation itself said
nothing about religion.77 The Court stated that the policy covered just 8% of
the world’s Muslim population and is limited to countries that were
previously designated by Congress or prior administrations as posing national
security risks.78
The Court said it was not in the position to substitute an assessment for
the Executive’s predictive judgments and that the page count of the review,
which was seventeen pages, offered little insight into the substance of the
report.79 The plaintiffs sought to discredit the findings of the review for
deviations from the baseline such as including Somalia and omitting Iraq, but
the Court said that the Proclamation justified such deviations because it
explained that the determinations were based upon distinct conditions in each
country’s circumstances.80
The Court pointed to three additional features of the entry policy which
supported a legitimate national security interest.81 The first was that since it
was introduced in January 2017, Sudan, Iraq, and Chad had been removed
from the list.82 The second was that the Proclamation had exceptions for
categories of foreign nationals.83 The third was the Proclamation’s waiver
program, which was open to all covered foreign nationals seeking entry as

73.
74.
75.
(1973)).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 2420.
Id.
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2420. (quoting Dep’t. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 553
Id. at 2419-20.
Id. at 2421.
Id.
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2421.
Id.
Id. at 2421.
Id. at 2422.
Id.
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immigrants and nonimmigrants.84 Pursuant to the Proclamation, consular
officers were to consider in each admissibility determination whether the
alien demonstrated that denying entry would cause undue hardship, entry
would not pose a threat to public safety, and that entry would be in the interest
of the United States.85 Notably, in addressing points made by the dissent, the
Court formally overruled the decision in Korematsu, the exclusion order
upheld by the Court in 1944 which called for the internment of JapaneseAmerican citizens.86 In abrogating that decision, Chief Justice Roberts said,
“[t]he forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and
explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope
of Presidential authority.”87
B. CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE KENNEDY
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in which he noted that
because of the substantial deference that must be accorded to the Executive
with respect to foreign affairs, it was unclear whether it would be proper for
judicial proceedings to continue, although this would be addressed on
remand.88 He pointed out that if proceedings continued, discovery and
preliminary matters must not intrude on the foreign affairs power of the
President.89 Justice Kennedy also called upon government officials to speak
and act with due regard to the Constitution and the rights it gives and protects,
even if those statements and actions are not subject to judicial scrutiny.90
C. CONCURRING OPINION BY JUSTICE THOMAS
Justice Thomas wrote separately. He noted § 1182(f) could not have set
judicially enforceable limits to constrain the President because he has
inherent authority to exclude aliens from the country.91 He said that the
Establishment Clause does not create an individual right to free people of
laws that a reasonable observer views as religious or antireligious.92 Justice
Thomas’ real concern was the propriety of universal injunctions, which
prohibit the Executive Branch from applying a law or policy against anyone.93
He doubted that they are consistent with the historical limits on equity and
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2422.
Id.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
Id. at 2424.
Id.
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2424.
Id.
Id. at 2525.
Id.
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judicial power and expressed skepticism that district courts have the authority
to issue this sort of injunction.94 He said that they take a toll on the federal
courts by encouraging forum shopping and making cases a national
emergency for the courts and the Executive branch.95 He emphasized that if
they continue to be issued, the Court will be duty-bound to adjudicate the
authority of courts to do so.96
D. DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE BREYER (WITH JUSTICE
KAGAN)
Justice Breyer’s dissent noted that if the government was not applying
the system of exemptions and waivers that the Proclamation contained, then
its argument for the Proclamation’s lawfulness became significantly
weaker.97 It pointed out that denying visas to Muslims who meet the
Proclamation’s security terms would support the view that the government
excludes them based upon their religion.98 He examined evidence that were
not judicial fact findings but statistics regarding entry since the Proclamation
that supported the possibility that the government was not applying the
Proclamation as it was written. 99 Justice Breyer said he would leave the
injunction in effect while the matter is litigated, but without further litigation,
he would find evidence of antireligious bias which would give a sufficient
basis to set the Proclamation aside.100
E. DISSENTING OPINION BY JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR (WITH
JUSTICE GINSBERG)
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent said regardless of the merits of Plaintiffs’
complex statutory claims, the Proclamation violates the Establishment
Clause’s guarantee of religious neutrality.101 She would have applied a more

94. Id.
95. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2525.
96. Id. at 2430.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2431.
99. Id. at 2433. (Justice Breyer said the Proclamation requires the Secretary of Homeland Security
to “coordinate to adopt guidance,” pursuant to § 3(c)(ii) of the Proclamation, but that to his knowledge no
guidance has issued. He looked at publicly available statistics which showed that during the
Proclamation’s first month, two waivers out 6,555 eligible applicants were approved. And while 15,000
Syrian refugees arrived in the United States in 2016, only 13 have arrived since January 2018, though the
Proclamation is not to be applied to asylum seekers or refugees. Statistics also showed that the 2018 student
visa issuance has been less than a quarter of the volume compared to those issued in 2016. Justice Breyer
further examined anecdotal evidence from amicus briefs. This dissent acknowledged that these sources of
evidence are not judicial fact findings, and that the Government has not had an opportunity to respond.)
100. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2434.
101. Id. at 2434-35.
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stringent standard of review typically applied to Establishment Clause
claims.102 In doing so, she said
the dispositive and narrow question here was whether a reasonable
observer, presented with all ‘openly available data,’ the text and
‘historical context’ of the Proclamation, and the ‘specific sequence
of events’ leading to it, would conclude that the primary purpose of
the Proclamation is to disfavor Islam and its adherents by excluding
them from the country.103
This dissent then cited over twenty instances along the campaign trail and
after taking office where President Trump and his advisers spoke about
banning Muslims and the dangers of Islam.104 For instance, the dissent
pointed out that the day President Trump signed EO–1, he said “[w]e all know
what this means,” and later explained to media that under that Order,
Christian refugees from Syria would be given priority for entry over Muslim
refugees.105 This dissent said that there was no explanation or precedential
support for the Court to limit its review to rational-basis scrutiny.106 In Justice
Sotomayor’s opinion, however, even under rational-basis review, the
Proclamation should have failed because the asserted national-security
rationale was nothing more than a sham.107 The dissent submitted that the
minor restrictions on North Korea and Venezuela were subtle efforts to avoid
looking biased toward Muslims, pointing out that North Korea was already
restricted by a prior sanctions order and the restrictions on Venezuela only
affected government officials.108 Justice Sotomayor questioned the review
process, pointing out that the government refused to make it publicly
available and that at least one individual in the review process exhibited antiMuslim bias.109
She then discussed the INA. She said, “Congress has already erected a
statutory scheme that fulfills the putative national-security interests the
Government now puts forth to justify the Proclamation.”110 and that the
government did not give a national security interest not addressed by the INA.

102. Id.
103. Id. at 2435-38.
104. Id. at 2436.
105. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2441.
106. Id. at 2441-42. (“That approach is perplexing, given that in other Establishment Clause cases,
including those involving claims of religious animus or discrimination, this Court has applied a more
stringent standard of review.”)
107. Id. at 2442.
108. Id. at 2443.
109. Id. at 2443-45.
110. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2444-45.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol45/iss1/9

12

Schaad: Trump v. Hawaii 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018)

2019]

TRUMP V. HAWAII

273

111

Further, she noted that several former national-security officials have
advised that the Proclamation did not advance national-security interests, but
did serious harm to them.112 This dissent posited that the Proclamation’s
waiver program was a sham, noting that “the remote possibility of obtaining
a waiver pursuant to an “ad hoc, discretionary, and seemingly arbitrary
process scarcely demonstrates that the Proclamation is rooted in a genuine
concern for national security.”113 The dissent compared the Proclamation to
the order in Korematsu, stating that “the exclusion order in Korematsu was
similarly rooted in dangerous stereotypes about, inter alia, a particular
group’s supposed inability to assimilate and desire to harm the United
States.”114
Justice Sotomayor went on to say that the Plaintiffs could obtain a
preliminary injunction.115 The dissent concluded that “[i]n holding that the
First Amendment gives way to an executive policy that a reasonable observer
would view as motivated by animus against Muslims, the majority opinion
upends this Court’s precedent, repeats tragic mistakes of the past, and denies
countless individuals the fundamental right of religious liberty.”116
IV.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. INTRODUCTION

The Court made several holdings in this case that warrant discussion and
will continue to have future effect. The overruling of Korematsu is certainly
laudable, but it is collateral to the focus of the case. The holding this
discussion will focus on is that a rational basis review should be applied to an
Establishment Clause claim concerning entry of foreign nationals.117 The
discussion will explain standards of review generally used for foreign affairs
and will discuss why rational basis review is problematic for Establishment
Clause claims, even in a foreign affairs context like this one. It will then
discuss some of the standards of review the Court has used for Establishment
111. Id. at 2445.
112. Id. at 2447.
113. Id. at 2445-46.
114. Id. at 2446.
115. Trump, at 2445-46. (Sotomayor J., dissenting) (She said they can get an injunction because
they have shown “likelihood of irreparable harm” without relief for being separated from family members
and diminished membership of the Muslim Association and recruitment to the University of Hawaii. The
“balance of equities tips in their favor” because the government only refers to nebulous national security
interests whereas the Plaintiffs have concrete allegations of harm. The injunction would be “in the public
interest” because it negatively affects higher education, national security, healthcare, artistic culture, the
technology industry, and the economy. (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20
(2008))).
116. Id. at 2446.
117. Id. at 2420. This holding is the primary focus of this article.
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Clause claims and suggest that a hybrid of the Lemon test and endorsement
test would be a more appropriate standard of review for Establishment Clause
claims regarding broad-sweeping entry policies.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND
EXECUTIVE ACTION
The challenge the Court faced in deciding which standard of review to
apply was no small matter. The deference due to the President in the arena
of foreign affairs makes rational basis review seem logical at first glance.118
The President and Congress have inherent authority to exclude aliens and this
determination is generally not questioned or disputed in courts.119 The Court
has said,
The power of congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United
States, or to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may
come to this country, and to have its declared policy in that regard
enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial
intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications.120
It is a tradition dating back to the founding of this country that the
President is to be trusted with foreign affairs (at least with respect to treaties
and foreign negotiations) without question.121
The nature of this
118. Id. at 2420. This however, is arguable. The dissent emphasized that the majority had no
precedential support to apply rational basis review to an Establishment Clause claim. (Id. at 2441.
(Sotomayor J., dissenting)).
119. U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); But see Curtis A. Bradley,
Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 650–51 (2000).
[T]he Supreme Court’s explanations for deference in this area have been characterized by
sweeping and unconvincing generalities, such as its description of the executive branch as the
‘sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.’ Its explanations
also have relied too heavily on a bright-line distinction between “foreign” and ‘domestic’—a
distinction that appears increasingly less tenable in this age of globalization.
(quoting U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
120. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522
(1954)).
121. Message to the House Regarding Documents Relative to the Jay Treaty (March 30, 1796), Yale
AVALON
PROJECT,
Law
School
Lillian
Goldman
Law
Library,
THE
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/gw003.asp (last visited September 25, 2018) (As George
Washington said in his Message to the House Regarding Documents Relative to the Jay Treaty:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on
secrecy; and even when brought to a conclusion a full disclosure of all the measures, demands,
or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely
impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce
immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The
necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making
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Proclamation, national security, is a bolster to the majority’s opinion that
deference should be given—in fact, ordinarily in this arena, the Court would
apply what is known as the Mandel standard, a standard even more deferential
than rational basis review.122 Mandel says, “when the Executive exercises
this [delegated] power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and
bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that
discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification.”123
The extraordinary complexity in this case, however, came with the
Establishment Clause claim and its nature and interpretations, in tandem with
the Proclamation. What should the Court do when faced with a President
who expresses plans to ban entry of a class of aliens, explaining that the
religion they practice is dangerous to the United States, who preliminarily
bans several of those nations, subsequently conducts a publicly unavailable
review which he says confirms that their entry would be unsafe, and then
writes a facially neutral Proclamation keeping the ban in place? The
Government conceded that a more stringent inquiry than Mandel would be
proper in this case. 124 It is arguable, however, that rational basis review as it
was applied was not any more deferential than Mandel would have been—
the majority quickly acknowledged, “[g]iven the standard of review, it should
come as no surprise that the Court hardly ever strikes down a policy as
illegitimate under rational basis scrutiny.”125
The Court said that so long as “the entry policy is plausibly related to the
Government’s stated objective to protect the country and improve vetting
processes,” the Proclamation would be upheld.126 The Court’s review
focused on the text of the Proclamation, the fact that a worldwide review was
conducted, the fact that three countries were removed from the list, and the
exemptions and waiver program contained in the Proclamation.127 This focus
would have unquestionably been proper if the claim itself did not arise from
statements made outside of the Proclamation. If the President had not made
the comments he did about Islam, there would not likely have been an
Establishment Clause claim that made its way to the Supreme Court.128
treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which that
body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the
House of Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers respecting
a negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.
122. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
123. Id. at 770.
124. Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2392 at 2420; Id. at 2440. (Sotomayor J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 2420.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2421-22.
128. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2439 (Sotomayor J., dissenting). (“Given President Trump’s failure to
correct the reasonable perception of his apparent hostility to the Islamic faith, it is unsurprising that the
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The Plaintiffs’ allegations were that that the stated purpose of improving
vetting procedures was a sham, and this claim was based on comments about
its purpose made outside the Proclamation.129 Considering that those
statements are the foundation of the plaintiffs’ claim, those statements should
have been a serious part of the judicial review, especially, as discussed below,
considering jurisprudence and previous interpretations of the Establishment
Clause. Instead, the majority pointed out less than half of the examples of
denigrating comments made by the President and said, “[t]he issue before us
is not whether to denounce the statements. It is instead the significance of
those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face,
addressing a matter within the core of executive responsibility.”130
C. STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
CLAIMS
The challenge the Court faced was made more complex when
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is viewed historically. To understate,
courts have had trouble deciding the proper standard to use when addressing
these claims, even without the added confusion of deferential review on
Executive action.131 The Court has been reticent to commit to any test or
standard for Establishment Clause claims because each tends to depend on
the circumstances at play.132
There are several standards of review that courts have used for
Establishment Clause claims, in part, because there are two schools of
thought about the Establishment Clause’s purpose. One view is strict
separationism, which relies on the Jeffersonian view of separation of church
and state.133 It demands an interpretation of the Establishment Clause that the
Government must protect free exercise of religion, prohibit the state and
federal governments from organizing a national church, and provide no aid
to any religion over another.134 The second view is the accommodationist
approach which takes the view that the Framers did not intend neutrality
toward religion, but that the Government cannot attempt to adopt one religion
for the country nor pass laws that differentiate between religions.135 These
differences sound subtle, but the devil is in the details when these claims are
President’s lawyers have, at every step in the lower courts, been unable to launder the Proclamation of its
discriminatory taint.”)
129. Id. at 2417.
130. Id. at 2418.
131. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 793.
132. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975).
133. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
134. Id.
135. David W. Cook. The Un-Establsihed Establishment Clause: A Circumstantial Approach to
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 11 TEX. L. REV. 71, 78 (2004).
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reviewed. This article will put its focus on just a few of the tests that the
Court has applied over the years.
One test courts have used is the “coercion test,” which seems to focus
literally on the word “establish,” looking only to whether the government has
coerced anyone into adhering to religious practices by governmental action
(i.e. establishing a national religion).136 Coercion is sufficient to constitute
an Establishment Clause claim, but precedent holds it is not essential; it is
only that if there has been coercion, the inquiry is over.137 Another standard
courts have used is a neutrality principle, which looks at whether
governmental action favors one religion over another.138 This standard has
been criticized as being difficult to apply on its own.139 The neutrality
principle seems to be an underlying tenet of many of the Court’s opinions but
does not seem to function effectively as a test on its own.
Courts have most consistently applied the Lemon test, which has three
components: “First the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion. . . finally, the statute must not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion.”140 The first component, that the legislative
purpose must have a secular purpose, has further been interpreted to mean the
motives of the Government actors, and the stated purposes supporting action,
must not be a sham.141 That “the principal purpose or primary effect must be
one that neither promotes nor inhibits religion” has been further interpreted
to mean that the government has not advanced religion through governmental
action and influence.142 The excessive entanglement prong looks to how
much the State aids or benefits “the character and purposes of the institutions.
. . the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and the resulting religious authority.”143
Noting that the Lemon test seemed to confuse courts, Justice O’Connor
wrote a concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly suggesting a helpful
clarification on the analytical framework of the Lemon test which has come
to be known as the endorsement test, and has gained some favor with the
Court as providing a framework for Lemon.144 She said that what the Lemon
136. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
137. Id.
138. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653 (2002).
139. Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened On the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles,
Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 500 (2004).
140. Lemon, 403 U.S. 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
141. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 586-87 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 64 (1985).
142. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 337 (1987).
143. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
144. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.668, 687-88; See also Cty of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
594-95 (1989). (Justice Blackmun adopted Justice O’Connor’s Endorsement test for the first time in a
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test is trying to convey is that a government action cannot have the effect of
creating the actual effect, or the public perception of governmental
endorsement or disfavor.145 The endorsement test says that the Establishment
Clause could be violated either by excessive entanglement or by endorsing or
disfavoring a religion. For the first component of the Lemon test, that the
legislation must have a secular purpose, the endorsement test asks “does the
government action intend to ‘convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion”146 For the second component, the principal or
primary purpose must not promote nor inhibit religion, she would ask “does
the action communicate or convey a message of government endorsement or
disapproval” of religion.147 According to Justice O’Connor, an affirmative
answer to either of the first two should render the challenged law invalid.148
D. APPLYING AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD
The foregoing should have made clear that the meaning of Establishment
Clause is contested. There have been paradigm shifts in reviewing
Establishment Clause claims, simmering atop competing views on how the
Establishment Clause should be interpreted and exactly what it demands.
This note seeks to combine the Lemon test and the endorsement test and
suggests a hybrid framework of the two that attempts to give deference to the
Executive action in a context like this one, while also giving weight to the
merits of plaintiff’s claims.
If the first Lemon test prong were applied, it would demand the order
have a secular purpose that is not a sham.149 The Court in Trump did point to
the stated secular purpose but did not consider the evidence presented to show
that it was a sham; it only looked to the face of the Proclamation in concluding
that it was not a sham.150 This is consistent with rational basis review, but it
is problematic in this case. It is no surprise that the order was facially
neutral—one of the pieces of evidence submitted by the plaintiffs was a
public comment from one of the President’s advisers that said, “[w]hen the
majority opinion in stating that religious endorsement is invalid because it, “sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members to the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community,” and “[e]very
government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it [endorses]
religion.”) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O’Connor J., concurring)).
145. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687. (O’Connor J., concurring). (“What is crucial is that a government
practice not have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion. It is only practices having that effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion
relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political community.”)
146. Id. at 691.
147. Id. at 692.
148. Id. at 690.
149. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 864.
150. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2421-23.
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President ‘first announced it, he said “Muslim ban.” He called me up. He said,
“Put a commission together. Show me the right way to do it legally.”“151
Even more problematic, however, is that with regard to the Establishment
Clause, the Court has said “facial neutrality is not determinative.”152
Had the Lemon test been applied, it would have looked at the surrounding
circumstances to glean insight to actual motives to determine if the stated
secular purposes were a sham.153 That is where the rational basis review
diverges from Lemon—rational basis scrutiny simply does not consider actual
motives, nor does it look beyond four corners into surrounding circumstances
if there is a legitimate reason for the act under review.154 The “intent” part of
this analysis, moreover, would also be a problematic line of questioning. First
of all, it is important that the Court does not engage in “judicial
psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of hearts.”155 Second, questioning the
intent of the Executive on an executive foreign policy might raise red flags in
the mind of even a novice to Supreme Court precedent.156
If the endorsement test, on the other hand, were applied to Trump it would
first ask: “Did the Government intend to convey a message of endorsement
or disapproval of religion with the Presidential Proclamation?”157 This is
problematic here, because it raises the same issues. However, the test has
further been refined to be asked from the standpoint of “a reasonable
observer, presented with all of the ‘openly available data,’ the text and
‘historical context,’ and the ‘specific sequence of events’ leading to it.”158
This would be somewhat more appropriate than a judicial inquiry into the
mind of the President.159 However, considering the delicate nature of foreign
affairs deference, this note submits that rather than looking at whether the
Government intended to send the message, it should look at whether a
reasonable observer would perceive a message of Government disapproval or
151. Id. at 2417.
152. Church of the Lukumi Babulu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
153. Id.
154. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’n Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993).
155. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862
156. However, it is worth noting that determining executive intent on a proclamation or executive
order is less problematic than determining legislative intent, because these are unilateral actions that do
not go the rigors of bicameralism and presentment. See Andrew M. Wright, Presidential Executive
Orders, 52-SUM. ARK. LAW. 30, 32 (2017) (discussing the unilateral nature of Presidential Proclamations
and Executive Orders).
157. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691.
158. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 862; but see William P. Marshall, “We Know it When We See It” The
Supreme Court Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV 495, 533-34 (1986) (noting the difficulty with the
reasonable observer standpoint in the context of religion, in that determining what may be religious or
antireligious can create perceptual problems; essentially, when considering that what a reasonable
Christian may view as having religious significance may vary widely from a person who holds different
religious values., and there is difficulty in determining whose view should govern.)
159. Id.
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endorsement of religion in the implementation of the policy. In other words,
to combine the two: Would a reasonable observer, presented with all of the
openly available data, the text and historical context, and the specific
sequence of events leading the policy, perceive that it is founded on religious
animus or favoritism?
This would not end the inquiry. The second question the Lemon test asks
whether the principal purpose or primary effect of the government action
either promoted or inhibited religion, such that the government advanced
religion through governmental action and influence.160 The endorsement test
clarified that wording to mean: Does the government action communicate a
message of endorsement or disapproval of religion? 161 This takes it out of
the realm of what was perceived and looks at what the action communicates.
To combine and rephrase the basic structure of the purpose and effects prong
without doing violence to these interpretations, this note submits that the
question could be rephrased for the entry policy context: Is the purpose of the
policy (the government act), as written and applied (communication and
effect), to target one particular faith or denomination (favor, inhibit, or
disapprove)?
Justice O’Connor’s idea of the endorsement test would say that an answer
to either one of these questions indicates a violation of the Establishment
Clause.162 However, this note suggests that within the foreign affairs context,
the analysis should not stop if the answer to the first question is “yes.” The
first question should be a consideration to be weighed against the second.
The first looks at the evidence surrounding the allegation, and the second
looks at the foreign policy’s implementation. The second prong should be
looked at much like the neutrality principle—are people of all faiths from the
restricted areas affected similarly?163 If the answer is that it does target one
denomination over others, with the exception of terrorist organizations
involved in religious extremism, then the policy would be unconstitutional.
However, if the answer to the first question is yes, and the answer to the
second question is no, a balancing must come into play. If the policy has a
legitimate purpose in the foreign affairs context, and does not discriminate
between religions, it may outweigh the first. This would require looking at
other factors, such as if it furthers or protects an interest that is not already
provided for in established immigration law or other foreign policies.164
To recapitulate, the questions as phrased for Trump would be:
160. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, 483 U.S. at 337.
161. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692.
162. Id. at 690.
163. Helms, 530 U.S. at 809.
164. See Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985).
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1. Would a reasonable observer, presented with the text, legislative
history, and implementation of the Proclamation, perceive that the
Proclamation was founded on animus toward the Islamic faith?
2. Is the purpose of the policy, as it is written and applied, to deny
entry to those of the Islamic faith?165
This note does not attempt to answer these questions, nor does it attempt
to presume how the Court would have ruled if they applied a similar standard
or another higher scrutiny standard—it only laments that it should have, for
reasons discussed briefly below.
V.

DISCUSSION

This note concedes that an extraordinary level of deference is generally
appropriate within the arena of foreign affairs. However, where a President
repeatedly and publicly expresses xenophobic viewpoints that single out a
minority for the religion they practice, then promises to soothe the public’s
fears with a sweeping policy that will limit entry to persons of that minority
faith, those statements should be considered under the Court’s review. If the
Court does not look beyond the face of the orders, it cannot determine
whether the stated secular purpose was designed to, and in effect does, target
a particular religion. Establishment Clause claims should be treated with
more demanding scrutiny, even in this context.
One reason for this is that the Establishment Clause is advances important
Constitutional values. The clause that follows it is the Free Exercise clause,
which creates the individual right for American citizens to exercise their own
religion.166 The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause work in
tandem with each other. The first protects the second. Official statements of
disapproval of a religion along with binding foreign policy allegedly targeted
at restricting those individuals may not infringe on the individual right to
exercise the religion within the country, but they have the undeniable effect
of suppressing the citizens who do.167 If the Government expresses that it
does not want a particular religion to enter the country, it simultaneously
sends a message to citizens who practice that faith that they are also

165. See Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (“The essence of all that has been said and written
on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”); The author of this note concedes that it
may seem odd to reformulate the endorsement test, considering that it is already a clarification in itself of
the Lemon test. However, this author feels that this test appropriately captures the essence of what should
be looked at, and prevented, when reviewing Establishment Clause claims.
166. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
167. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986).
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unwelcome.168 These detrimental psychosocial implications should not be
ignored.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court set up a dangerous precedent in this decision by
deciding that rational basis review will be applied to claims like this, because
it gives free-reign to the Executive to close off borders on a pretext of even
absolute discrimination with essentially no judicial check. This opens the
door to tyranny at worst. At best, it breeds feelings of fear and inhibits
citizens who practice that religion within United States, and breeds distrust
against those citizens by people who do not.169 Often those people targeted
will be a minority, who feel that they cannot turn to the democratic process
to protect themselves because of their minority.170 Now the Court has decided
that when religious restrictions start at the borders, these citizens cannot turn
to the Constitution either. A more stringent standard of review should apply,
if not only for the sake of the principles of tolerance and fairness.
TIFFANY R. SCHAAD

168. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
169. Id. at 688.
170. Shimonek, supra note 11 at 858-59 (1990).
In effect, the Eighth Circuit conclusion implies that a minority which feels it is subjected to the
religious views of the majority should not look to the Constitution, or the courts, for protection.
Rather, they should attempt to enforce the Constitution themselves through the democratic
process. Minorities may find little comfort in this proposition. It is because they are minorities
that the majority is able to impose its beliefs on them. The politically powerless minorities,
therefore, are left with little or no protection.
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